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EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE: AMPLIFYING EMPLOYEE VOICE
WITHOUT SILENCING EMPLOYERS-A PROPOSAL FOR
REFORMING THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Amy Livingston*
This Note investigates the effectiveness of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) in balancing unions, employers', and employees' rights during the course
of union organizing drives. After reviewing case law and commentary, it con-
cludes that the NLRA's certification regime is ineffective and permits pressures that
inhibit employees from expressing their real desires about whether or not to be repre-
sented by a union. This Note then examines proposed alternatives for certifying
unions, and takes note of Canada's federal and ten provincial certification re-
gimes. Finally, it concludes that the NLRA must be amended to protect worker free
choice, and proposes reforms including limiting unions to a public sixty-day or-
ganizing campaign, designing a uniform authorization card to be submitted with
a fee by employees desiring union representation, and establishing a verification
process for these cards.
INTRODUCTION
Fueled by six decades of steadily declining American unioniza-
tion rates,' scholars and union representatives alike have long
debated whether the seventy-five year old National Labor Relations
Act (the NLRA)2 sufficiently protects employee free choice in de-
termining whether to be represented by a union. Although
different explanations have been offered for the decline in union
density, most observers agree that it has resulted in part from
changes in the structure of the American economy. Unionization
levels peaked when the labor market was based on large
manufacturing employers; the current economy is more diverse in
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Michigan Law School; B.A. 2009, Grinnell Col-
lege. Note Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Volume 45. Special thanks to
Professor Theodore J. St. Antoine for his support and feedback throughout the writing pro-
cess. I would also like to thank Erin Eckles and Clara Park for their invaluable editorial
contributions.
1. In the 1950s, thirty-five percent of the American private sector workforce was un-
ionized. See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review
and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REv. 351, 361 (2002). In 1975, only twenty-five percent of
the workforce was unionized. See Henry S. Farber, Union Membership in the United States: The
Divergence Between the Public and Pivate Sectors 1 (Princeton Univ., Working Paper No. 503,
2005). Today, less than seven percent of the private sector workforce is represented by un-
ions. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, USDL-11-0063, Economic News Release
(Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006).
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employer size and more heavily service-based. Most critics also
agree that labor's decline has been exacerbated by technological
advancements that allow machines to do tasks that once required
human labor4 and permit work to take place both outside the tradi-
tional workspace and beyond a traditional nine-to-five work
schedule. Additional theories for the decline include the US labor
market's geographical shift to the Sunbelt;6 the new global econo-
my;' that other employment legislation has made the "protections"
provided by a labor union less necessary;8 or simply that more at-
tractive working conditions are available in nonunion companies,
leading fewer workers to seek union representation.9 Interestingly,
the decline in union density has remained constant across presi-
dential administrations, continuing throughout both the Clinton
years (featuring a labor-friendly NLRB) and Republican years (where
the NLRB was less pro-union). o
These explanations cannot fully account for the decline of un-
ions in America." Other industrialized countries' economies have
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOY-
MENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAw 2-3 (1993) [hereinafter GOULD, AGENDA]; Robert J.
LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at the Significance of Em-
ployer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 956 (1991) (giving the example of the decline in the
steel and automobile industries).
4. Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Barry T. Hirsch, The Rise and Fall of Private Sector Unionism:
What's Next for the NLRA?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133, 1138 (2007). Hirsch also cites "an
increasingly competitive domestic and international economy coupled with union wage
premiums that have shown surprisingly modest declines" as explanations for unions' de-
cline. Id. See also Befort, supra note 1, at 352.
5. See Befort, supra note 1, at 368-69.
6. See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONs Do? 31
(1984); LaLonde & Meltzer, supra note 3, at 957 (explaining that the Sunbelt is less recep-
tive to unionization). In addition, the Sunbelt is comprised of many right-to-work states.
Right to Work States Map, NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION, INC.
(2001), http://www.nrtw.org/rtws.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
7. See, e.g., GOULD, AGENDA, supra note 3, at 12; Befort, supra note 1, at 362. Befort al-
so attributes the decline in unionization rates to the changing workforce composition
(including more women and minority employees than ever before) and the increase in
contingent workers (independent contractors, leased, and part-time employees). Befort,
supra note 1, at 365-69.
8. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT 18
(2009). This protective legislation includes the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34
(1967); and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006).
9. CharlesJ. Morris, A Blueprint for Reform of the National Labor Relations Act, 8 ADMIN.
L.J. AM. U. 517, 533-34 (1994).
10. Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 4, at 1139.
11. But see EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 18 ("Some likely reasons [for the observed de-
cline] include the expansion of free trade across national borders, more intensive global
competition for employees, the reduced appeal of unions to younger workers, the entry of
smaller decentralized firms, the rapid turnover of workers in a relatively open economy, the
better wages and working conditions that nonunion employees can command in an open
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changed, but their labor markets have experienced a less dramatic
decline in unionization.12 Moreover, domestic surveys consistently
find high levels of union support among workers: a recent study
found that nearly three out of five Americans "would join a union
if they could." This support for unions has been borne out in
practice, as unions have increasingly won representation elec-
tions-in 1980, unions won just over forty-five percent of
elections; in 2000, unions won fifty percent of elections; and in
2009 and 2010, unions won almost seventy percent of elections. *
The incongruity between American workers' expressed desire for
union representation and the continuous decline in unionization
rates has caused union supporters to contend that the NLRA struc-
turally hinders unions from organizing workplaces: it was
"[d]esigned for a different era and type of workplace" and has
"limited relevance today."17
The NLRA was originally enacted to foster unionization. The
1935 Wagner Act's stated national policy-which remains part of
the NLRA today-is:
[T]o eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions
to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate
these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by
economy, the rise in governmental regulation[] ... ineffective union organizing, and the
rigidity of the internal governance structure of unions themselves. Most important perhaps
is the fundamental switch in the political economy of the United States.").
12. Id. at 13.
13. See David Madland & Karla Walter, Unions are Good for the American Economy,
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS ACTION FUND, at 1 (Feb. 18, 2009), http://
www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2009/02/efca factsheets.html; see also RICHARD B.
FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 17 (1999) (finding an implied desire rate
of private sector unionization of forty percent, with approximately one-third of nonun-
ion/nonmanagerial workers desiring unionization). But see Befort, supra note 1, at 376-77
(explaining that union decline is caused by union unpopularity: unions are seen as "bureau-
cratic and outdated" and do not fit with America's "rugged individualis[t]" mentality).
14. NLRB, FORTY-FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30 1980, at 3 (1980).
15. NLRB, SIXTY-FiFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30 2000, at 1 (2000).
16. See NLRB, SEVENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30 2009, at 1 (2009) [hereinafter NLRB
REPORT, 2009]; Number of NLRB Elections Held in 2010 Increased Substantially from Pre-
vious Year, 2011 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 85, at B-1 (May 3, 2011) (reporting that unions
prevailed in 67.6% of elections held in calendar year 2010, and in 68.7% of elections held in
calendar year 2009). This phenomenon may be explained by increased union selectivity in
filing certification petitions or an overall change in union strategy regarding the withdrawal
of petitions before an anticipated unfavorable vote.
17. See Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 4, at 1134. See also FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note
13, at 2.
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protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of associa-
tion, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.
Detractors point out that the Act was expressly modified in 1947
to clarify that its purpose is not to promote unionization, but ra-
ther to further employee free choice. The Taft-Hartley
amendments to the NLRA changed Section 7 to include the em-
ployees' rights to refrain from unionizing:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all such activities. .. .9
Thus, there is a tension between the NLRA's stated goals of foster-
ing collective bargaining and preserving employee free choice.
A recurring complaint is that the Act unfairly prejudices unions.
First, its sanctions arguably fail to deter employers from commit-
ting unfair labor practices that hinder unions' efforts to organize
workplaces. More importantly, however, the NLRA as a whole al-
legedly manifests an inherent anti-union preference, allowing
employers far too much legal latitude throughout the organizing
process and even after a union is certified."o For example, after a
union's certification, employers can bargain in "good faith" but
nevertheless lawfully fail to reach a contract with a certified un-
ion.2 ' After more than fifty years of labor's decline, the NLRA
clearly requires reformation.
This Note proposes that employees' "free choice" regarding un-
ion representation would be safeguarded if Congress amended the
National Labor Relations Act so that: (1) unions must file a notice
with the NLRB prior to commencing a fixed sixty-day card signing
campaign, with unions subject to harsh penalties for 'jumping the
gun" and commencing organizing prior to this time; (2) a uniform
18. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (emphasis added).
20. See, e.g., Yungsuhn Park, Note, The Immigrant Workers Union: Challenges Facing Low-
Wage Immigrant Workers in Los Angeles, 12 ASIAN AM. L.J. 67, 90 (2005).
21. See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, Labor Law Reform: Waiting for Congress?, 69 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 277, 283 (1993).
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union authorization card is designed, effective for that limited
sixty-day duration, and required to be submitted with one month's
union dues from each employee as an indication of support for
unionization in the certification process; and (3) the NLRB estab-
lishes a verification or revocation process for these cards.
Part I of this Note presents an overview of the current union or-
ganizing system. Part II explains why reform is necessary. Part III
examines various proposed reforms, including the Employee Free
Choice Act, as well as the deficiencies of these approaches. Part IV
examines the Canadian labor organizing system for lessons to be
applied in reforming the American system. Finally, Part V explains
how the reforms described above will balance a union's right to
organize, an employer's right to express its own views in its work-
place, and most importantly, an employee's right to hear and
express multiple views regarding the costs and benefits of union
representation, and to exercise, in private, free choice to make an
informed decision.
I. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT2
The union organizing process begins when a union undertakes
to organize a particular workplace. Once a union is satisfied that it
has substantial support, the union may file a petition with the
23NLRB seeking its certification. The petition must be supported by
a "showing of interest" from at least thirty percent of the workforce
24
in the relevant bargaining unit designated in the petition.
22. This Note's summary of the NLRA and its procedures is based on current law. The
NLRB is currently undertaking an expedited rulemaking procedure, however, which would
shorten the time between the filing of a certification petition and the election date and limit
the opportunity for the Board to conduct a full evidentiary hearing or review contested
issues before the election. Proposed Amendments to NLRB Election Rules and Regulations Fact
Sheet, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/node/525 (last visited
Sept. 28, 2011).
23. 29 U.SC. § 159(c)(1)(A) (2006). Although an employer may not normally petition
for an election (because it could force a premature election, before the union has swayed a
majority of the workers to vote pro-union), it may submit a petition for an NLRB election if
a union claims to represent a majority of its employees and has attempted to bargain with
the employer on behalf of the workers. § 159(c) (1) (B). See KENNETH C. McGUINESS, How
To TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 49-50 (1976), for a more
complete discussion of an employer's rights to petition the NLRB to determine a union's
status as its employees' bargaining representative.
24. See McGuINEsS, supra note 23, at 63; see also Charles B. Craver, Expanding Boundaries
of the Law: Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The Inadequacy of Modest Proposals to Reform
Labor Law, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1616, 1635 (1995) (explaining that in practice, however, union
officials try to get sixty or seventy percent of the individuals in proposed units to sign cards
before petitioning for an election). If other unions are concurrently attempting to organize
that workforce, they need only demonstrate a ten percent showing of interest to intervene
223FALL 2011 ]
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Employees typically show their support through authorization
cards (which are usually both signed and dated) ' but their desires
may also be established by other means, such as a signed petition
or dues receipts. 26 The cards' presumed validity can be overturned
based on strong proof that the signatures resulted from misrepre-
sentation or coercion.2 ' An employer is neither permitted to see
the cards, nor to challenge any NLRB findings regarding its inves-
tigation or the cards' authenticity.
At this point, the NLRB will determine whether it has jurisdic-
tion over the employer and whether there are any bars to holding
the election.6 If an election is appropriate, the NLRB's Regional
Director will attempt to facilitate an agreement between the union
and the employer regarding the details for an election.o If no stip-
ulated or consent election agreement is reached, the Regional
Director will order a representation hearing, where disagreements
can be litigated and decisions can be made about the appropriate-
ness of the election, the determination of an appropriate
bargaining unit (based on a commonality or "community of inter-
est"), and potential determinations of who may vote in the
election.3' Once an election is directed, the Board also requires an
employer to provide it with a list of the names and addresses of eli-
fully in the NLRB proceedings, and can achieve a spot on any NLRB ballot with an even
smaller showing of interest. See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, CASEHANDLING MANU-
AL PART Two: REPRESENTATION PROCEEDINGS §§ 11023.3, 11023.4 (2007) [hereinafter
NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL]; McGUINESS, supra note 23, at 66.
25. See DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, LABOR LAW IN A NUTSHELL 14 (4th ed. 2000); NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND STATEMENTS OF PROCEDURE
§ 101.17 (2002); DOUGLAS E. RAY, CALVIN WILLIAM SHARPE & ROBERT N. STRASSFELD, UN-
DERSTANDING LABOR LAw 75 (1999).
26. See McGUINESS, supra note 23, at 66-67; RAY, SHARPE & STRASSFELD, supra note 25,
at 75-76.
27. See McGUINESS, Supra note 23, at 63, 68-69; NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE IN REPRESENTATION CASES 44 (2008) [hereinafter
NLRB, OUTLINE]; James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects
for Changing Paradigms, 90 IowA L. REV. 819, 861 (2005).
28. See S.H. Kress & Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1244, 1248-49 (1962); see also LESLIE, supra note
25, at 14; McGUINESS, supra note 23, at 63, 66.
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2006); RAY, SHARPE & STRASSFELD, supra note 25, at 76;
ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, LABOR RELATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY SERIES: NLRB REGULATION OF
ELECTION CONDUCT 7-8 (1985) (clarifying that the Board will also look to whether the unit
is appropriate for collective bargaining, whether a bonafide question of representation exists,
whether the petition is timely, and whether there is sufficient employee interest to warrant
holding the election).
30. McGUINESS, supra note 23, at 97-101; RAY, SHARPE & STRASSFELD, supra note 25, at
79.
31. LESLIE, supra note 25, at 15; McGUINESS, supra note 23, at 132-35. For instance,
the union and the employer may contest whether individuals are supervisors under Section
2(11) of the Act, who are excluded from voting in union elections, thus leading to long
decisional processes and greater delays.
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gible voters (an "Excelsior list"), which is then given to the union
to facilitate union-employee communication.
Finally, a secret ballot election among eligible employees in the
bargaining unit will be held (unless prolonged by a hearing or un-
fair labor practice charges that "block" the election), typically
about thirty-eight days after the Board receives the petition and
signed cards. If more than fifty percent of the employees who cast
ballots favor unionization, the union will be certified as the "exclu-
sive bargaining agent" for all employees in that group, including
individuals who either did not vote or voted against union repre-
sentation. The employer may no longer bargain directly with
members of the bargaining unit, even if the employee initiates the
meeting.
Because secret ballot elections are not the exclusive means for
certifying a union under the Act, 6 a number of early representa-
tion issues were decided without elections. In 1939, however, the
NLRB opined that "[a]lthough in the past we have certified repre-
sentatives without an election upon a showing of the sort here
made, we are persuaded by our experience that the policies of the
Act will best be effectuated if the question of representation which
has arisen is resolved in an election by secret ballot."38 As the Su-
preme Court explained thirty years later in NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co.,3" it would be
closing [its] eyes to obvious difficulties . . . if [it] did not rec-
ognize that there have been abuses, primarily arising out of
misrepresentations by union organizers as to whether the ef-
fect of signing a card was to designate the union to represent
32. McGuINESS, supra note 23, at 82; RAY, SHARPE & STRASSFELD, supra note 25, at 83.
33. See Lafe E. Solomon, Acting General Counsel, General Counsel Memorandum 11-
03, at "Introduction" (Jan. 10, 2011), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/general-
counsel-memos (explaining that 95.1% of all initial elections were conducted within fifty-six
days of the filing of the petition, and initial elections were conducted in a median of thirty-
eight days from the filing of the petition).
34. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(a), 159(c)(3) (2006); McGuINESS, supra note 23, at 201, 204.
If fifty percent or fewer of those casting ballots vote in favor of the union, there will be no
union representation and no union can organize that bargaining unit for at least one year.
§ 159(c) (3).
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
36. See § 159.
37. Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.LR.B. 526, 531 (1939).
38. Id. The Board came to the same conclusion in another decision handed down the
same day (July 12) in Armour & Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 567, 572 (1939).
39. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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the employee for collective bargaining purposes or merely to
40
authorize it to seek an election to determine that issue.
The Court went on to say that elections are the "most satisfactory-
indeed the preferred-method of ascertaining whether a union
has majority support."" Thus, the secret ballot election has become
the default method of union certification.
II. CRITIQUES OF THE NLRA's ORGANIZING PROCESS
For decades, critics have objected to this system, claiming that
employees lack power and. choice in determining whether they
wish to be represented by a union. A number of articles have
summarized unions' struggles to organize employees-even em-
ployees who support the unionization of their workplace. 42 Thus,
commentators conclude that the NLRA's union organizing process
itself is inherently anti-union and anti-choice. They contend that:
employers are able to tip the scales in their favor by committing
unfair labor practices, the inefficiency of the Board leads to long
delays that hamper union chances of victory, and finally that the
very procedures outlined in the Act disadvantage unions.
A. Employer Unfair Labor Practices
Most critics hold employers primarily responsible for the un-
healthy campaign environment." They argue that employer unfair
labor practices44 committed during union organizing campaigns
chill employee support for unions.5 A wealth of anecdotal evi-
40. Id. at 604.
41. Id. at 602.
42. See, e.g., TA. Frank, The Little Unions that Couldn't, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 22, 2009.
43. See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Un-
der the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983) [hereinafter Weiler, Promises].
44. Employer unfair labor practices are outlined in 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2006).
45. See Weiler, Promises, supra note 43, at 1778 (arguing that employers can easily con-
vince unsophisticated employees of the negative features of unionization (dues, strikes, and
potential job loss) while concurrently demonstrating the advantages of individual bargain-
ing (without union interference) to employees); see also Cynthia Estlund, Freeing Employee
Choice: The Case for Secrecy in Union Organizing and Voting, 123 HARv. L. REv. F. 10 (2010)
[hereinafter Estlund, Choice]. Note that unfair labor practices may be committed at any time
during the employment relationship: in 2009, most allegations of employer unfair labor
practices alleged employers violating the duty to bargain in good faith. See NLRB REPORT,
2009, supra note 16, at 5.
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dence4 6 and case law" supports this conclusion. Although studies
have confirmed that employers commit unfair labor practices, the
statistics in support of these findings vary wildly.4" Kate Bron-
fenbrenner, a prominent labor activist, conducted a three-year
study in the 1990s where she found that fifty percent of employers
threatened to shut down or move their operations should their
workplaces become unionized, regardless of the employer's actual
financial situation.4 9 Bronfenbrenner concluded that these em-
ployer threats were motivated by anti-union animus alone.o
Another study found that employers illegally fired employees to
reduce union support in twenty-five percent of union organizing
drives.5 More recently, a report found that in union organizing
drives during 2002, fifty-nine percent of employers promised to
improve employee wages,5 2 fifty-one percent used bribery or
favoritism to persuade workers to vote against the union," forty-
nine percent threatened to close or relocate a worksite if the union
prevailed,5 4  ninety-one percent required employees to attend
anti-union meetings with supervisors,"5 and thirty percent fired
56
workers allied with the union.
46. See Strengthening America's Middle Class Through the Employee Free Choice Act: Hearing on
H.R. 800 Before the H. Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions, 100th Cong.
(2007) [hereinafter Strengthening America's Middle Class].
47. Barker v. Regal Health Care & Rehab Ctr., 632 F. Supp. 2d 817 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(finding eleven of thirteen licensed employees signed union authorization cards, leading
the employer to conduct an anti-union campaign consisting of fifteen unfair labor practices
and terminating or threatening to terminate each of the eleven employees).
48. For a summary of twelve studies examining the effects of management opposition
on union certification, see FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 6, at 234-35 tbl.15-4.
49. Kate Bronfenbrenner, Final Report: The Effects of Plant Closing or Threat of Plant Clos-
ing on the Right of Workers to Organize, Report to the Labor Secretariat of the North American
Commission for Labor Cooperation, 2, Sept. 30, 1996. Bronfenbrenner found that this rate
is higher (62%) in more "mobile" industries, such as manufacturing, transportation, and
warehouse/distribution, and lower in less mobile industries, such as healthcare, education,
and retail. Id.
50. Id.
51. John Godard, Joseph B. Rose & Sara Slinn, Should Congress Pass the Employee Free
Choice Act? Some Neighborly Advice, 15JUST LABOUR: A CANADIANJ. OF WORK & Soc'Y 116, 117
(2009).
52. CHIRAG MEHTA & NIK THEODORE, AMERICAN RIGHTS AT WORK, UNDERMINING
THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE: EMPLOYER BEHAVIOR DURING UNION REPRESENTATION CAM-
PAIGNS 9 tbl.2 (2005).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 15 tbl.3.
56. Id. at 5. For an argument that employer unfair labor practice statistics are overstat-
ed, see EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 52; LaLonde & Meltzer, supra note 3, at 996-98. LaLonde
and Meltzer argue that the incidence is often overrated at one in twenty and (for 1980) was
more accurately one in sixty. LaLonde & Meltzer, supra note 3, at 1006.
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These studies confirm that employer threats are most effective
where an NLRB election is required: one study found that employ-
er unfair labor practices are twice as effective when a certification
vote is required. Moreover, the study found that four out of five
American workers fear that they will lose their jobs if they vote for
union representation, 8 indicating that these threats chill union
support among workers. The success of these tactics has been at-
tributed to the heightened vulnerability of employees during a
union organizing campaign and the "aggressive and hierarchical"
nature of any employer communication.55 These threats succeed
because of the message they send: where employees are terminated
for supporting a union and later offered reinstatement via the
NLRB, only about forty percent took their job back, mainly be-
cause they fear employer retaliation.o Moreover, the extensive
delay between an unfair labor practice charge's filing, the issuance
of an NLRB complaint, and the issuance of an ultimate and en-
forceable NLRB decision averaged 483 days in 2009,' meaning that
the reinstatement lost all effect as an example to other workers.
Lengthy Board delays in conducting elections or remedying unfair
labor practices cause employees to lose interest and conclude that
unions are ineffective and will be unable to address their employ-
62ment concerns.
Although these facts provide strong evidence of the NLRA elec-
tion process's ineffectiveness, the actual prevalence of unfair labor
63practices during union organizing drives is disputed. Many studies
critical of the NLRB have been biased: they interviewed only union
organizers, misstated the law, or used descriptions that considered
acts to be "unfair labor practice [s]" even where the acts are not
actually illegal." Moreover, other studies have found that the statis-
tical likelihood of an employer illegally firing an employee during
a union organizing drive is less than three percent.
57. See Godard, Rose & Slinn, supra note 51, at 118. Bronfenbrenner conducted her
own analysis and concluded that unions won thirty-three percent of elections where these
threats occurred, but won forty-seven percent where these threats did not occur. Bron-
fenbrenner, supra note 49, at 2.
58. Godard, Rose & Slinn, supra note 51, at 117.
59. Brudney, supra note 27, at 832.
60. See Weiler, Pmmises, supra note 43, at 1792.
61. NLRB REPORT, 2009, supra note 16, at 152.
62. See GOULD, AGENDA, supra note 3, at 158.
63. For an attack on Bronfenbrenner's bias and study, see EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 40-
42.
64. EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 40-41.
65. See Thomas P. Gies, Card Check: Changing the Rules for Collective Bargaining, AMERI-




Whatever the actual prevalence of unfair labor practices, the fact
that employers commit them at all suggests that employees may be
deterred from expressing their real desires regarding unionization,
which indicates that the Act requires reform. For an employer,
committing an unfair labor practice may be an acceptable risk. The
penalty imposed by the NLRB (often back pay minus the wages
that the employee earned elsewhere) is discounted by the en-
hanced probability that the union will lose the election and merely
represents a cost of doing business.
It is worth noting, however, that some studies have concluded
that employer unfair labor practices do not influence employees,
belying the Board's assumption that employees' tenuous pre-
campaign support for a union is easily altered by an employer's
anti-union campaign. One such study, which interviewed the same
employees right after the direction of an election and again imme-
diately after the election," found that eighty-seven percent of
employees voted consistently with their stated pre-election intent
to vote for or against the union. With results consistent across a
wide range of localities and situations," the study found that em-
ployees largely ignore union and employer campaigns" and
instead vote according to their feelings about unions that existed
before the campaign began.7 ' Even unfair labor practices had little
effect on employees' votes. Thus, the dismissal of union support-
ers during an organizing campaign did not adversely affect
employees who originally intended to vote for unions.
66. See LaLonde & Meltzer, supra note 3, at 964.
67. JULIUS G. GETMAN, STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG & JEANNE B. HERMAN, UNION REPRE-
SENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 33 (1976).
68. Id. The data came from thirty-one union elections occurring between February
1972 and September 1973, and included data from a number of different businesses, com-
munities, and unit sizes. Id. at 34.
69. Id. at 69-70.
70. Id. at 65-66.
71. Id. at 109 (finding that the average employee remembers only ten percent of the
issues raised in a company's campaign, and only seven percent of the issues raised in a union
campaign).
72. Id. at 96-97 ("[N]either company nor union supporters pay particularly close at-
tention to the campaign. Their voting decision is based on attitudes that antedate the
campaign."). Indeed, employees' "predispositions tend to insulate them from the effect of
[a] campaign." Id. at 97.
73. Id. at 128-29.
74. Id. at 130.
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B. Delay
A second main complaint about the NLRA procedure stems
from the first: the process is plagued by delays. Union representa-
tion elections are held a median of thirty-eight days after the filing
of the petition for certification, and 95.1% of elections are held
within fifty-six days of filing the petition.15 Rather than allowing
workers additional time for reflection, these delays cause the union
to lose momentum as workers become increasingly frightened that
they, too, will be terminated should they support the union. Stud-
ies have repeatedly found links between union election losses and
long delays." One study found that a union's chances of winning
an election decreased by 0.29% for each day of delay, leading re-
searchers to conclude that delay weakens employee confidence in
the Board's effectiveness and the union itself.7 ' Delays cause em-
ployees to remain vulnerable for longer periods of time and
provide a larger window for the employer to mount extended ille-
gal campaigns designed to dissuade employees from voting in favor
of unionization. The converse argument, however, is that an em-
ployer maintains the lawful "free speech" right to communicate its
own views under Section 8(c) of the NLRA:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dis-
semination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or
visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice under any of the provisions of this [Act], if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise
of benefit.80
75. See Lafe E. Solomon, Acting General Counsel, General Counsel Memorandum 11-
03, at 2 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/
09031d458043b761.
76. See Weiler, Promises, supra note 43, at 1794-95.
77. Id. at 1776-77 ("My thesis, however, is that the decline in union success in repre-
sentation campaigns is in large part attributable to deficiencies in the law: evidence suggests
that the current certification procedure does not effectively insulate employees from the
kinds of coercive antiunion employer tactics that the NLRA was supposed to eliminate. It is
the time lag between the filing of a representation petition and the vote, usually about two
months, that gives the employer the opportunity to attempt to turn its employees against the
union.").
78. Julie Martinez Ortega & Erin Johansson, The Facts Behind the Employee Free Choice Act,
AMERICAN RIGHTS AT WORx 10 (2009), http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/
ARAWReports/araw _thefactsbehindefca.pdf.
79. Roomkin & Juris, Unions in the Traditional Sectors: The Mid-Life Passage of the Labor
Movement, 31 PROC. ANN. MEETING INDUS. REL. RESEARCH Ass'N. 212, 217-18 (1978).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006).
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Thus, even lawful anti-union campaigns will likely diminish support
for a union. Moreover, delay can make it more likely that employ-
ees will leave due to normal turnover, increasing the difficulty for a
union to maintain support in any workplace.
C. Anti-Union Bias
Critics have also repeatedly asserted that the overall union
organization process is flawed, even where employers do not com-
mit unfair labor practices. These detractors argue that the Act's
anti-union bias can be seen in the definition of an employer unfair
labor practice. For example, in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., the
Court drew a fine distinction between an employer's unlawful
"threat" of closure and its lawful prediction "on the basis of
objective fact" that the "demonstrably probable consequence []" of
unionization is closure.8 2 Although a number of line-drawing prob-
lems are inherent in any definition, critics argue that the current
standards provide too much latitude for employers to make un-
founded or tenuous predictions that influence employees' votes in
union elections. Finally, captive audience meetings,84 legal under
the NLRA, are allegedly so successful at chilling union support that
85
critics contend they should be considered unfair labor practices.
This is because these speeches are
a display of employer power. . . a message about where power
in the employment relationship rests, about the limits of a un-
ion's power (because unions are not likewise permitted to
address workers at the workplace), and about the state's
81. See Sheila Murphy, Comment, A Comparison of the Selection of Bargaining Representa-
tives in the United States and Canada: Linden Lumber, Gissel, and the Right to Challenge Majority
Status, 10 COMP. LAB. L.J. 65, 95 (1988).
82. 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969).
83. See EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at S9.
84. Captive audience meetings are meetings held by an employer during work hours
where the employer speaks to employees about unionization. As long as their contents are
not otherwise coercive, these speeches are permitted under Section 8(c) of the NLRA. They
may not take place within twenty-four hours of the election. McGUINESS, supra note 23, at
166; RAY, SHARPE & STRASSFELD, supra note 25, at 102-04.
85. See, e.g., Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and
Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 560 (1993); David J. Doorey, The Medium and the
"Anti-Union" Message: "Forced Listening" and Captive Audience Meetings in Canadian Labor Law,
29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'YJ. 79 (2008).
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opinion of this imbalance of power and communicative access
in the workplace.
Moreover, critics point out that any employer speech will neces-
sarily bias employees against unions. This is because employers "do
not express their opinion in a vacuum," and behind an employer's
speech "lies the full weight of [its] economic position" and
influence over employees. This theory is shown in studies finding
positive correlations between employers' use of legal means of
communicating with their employees and decreased union elec-
tion success. Thus, employers can influence employee choice
without breaking the law.
Likewise tilting the scale in the employer's favor, the NLRB usu-
ally conducts secret ballot elections at the employer's workplace.
This factor is widely considered prejudicial, foremost because em-
ployer influence permeates the physical space of the workplace.
Empirical research has confirmed this effect, arguing that if the
"uncommitted" are brought to the polls in larger numbers (which
is likely to occur if the election is held at their workplace), they will
vote to preserve the status quo." When a union objects to the elec-
tion being held on the employer's premises, it must show good
cause for the election to be held elsewhere."
Finally, some critics have refused to address these individual el-
ements and have instead pointed to the weaknesses of the current
system as a whole. Current NLRB Member Craig Becker has ar-
gued previously that employers should have no role in the
unionizing process.8 Former Senator Arlen Specter expressed a
somewhat less radical view, opining: "[u]nion representation elec-
tions are often conducted in an environment of intimidation and
coercion,""" implying that the current system will fail to accurately
measure employees' views on unionization. This has often been
explained by the NLRA's majoritarian principles, which naturally
invite and encourage opposition between unions and manage-
86. Doorey, supra note 85, at 80.
87. Becker, supra note 85, at 539.
88. Id. at 567.
89. See NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 24, at § 11302.2. Although present-
ed with an opportunity to revisit this issue, the NLRB declined to do so recently in Mental
Health Ass'n, Inc., 356 NLRB No. 151, 1 n.4 (2011), available at http://op.bna.com/
dlrcases.nsf/id/1due-8ghr3v/$File/mental%20health%20assn.pdf
90. See Becker, supra note 85, at 500.
91. Senator Arlen Specter & Eric S. Nguyen, Representation Without Intimidation: Securing




ment.92 One analysis concluded that the current union organizing
system leads to an "underproduction" of worker voice, worker par-
ticipation, and worker-management cooperation." Surprisingly, it
found that these problems exist whether or not a workplace is un-
* * s94ionized)4
The current organizing process also discourages employees from
attempting to unionize their workplaces:
The fact that the benefits of representation come in the fu-
ture, and often over a long time, exacerbates the problem: the
workers who bear the substantial short-term costs of organiz-
ing in the face of employer resis-tance [sic] can capture only a
fraction of the benefits of representation; and even those
benefits tend to be overdiscounted [sic] because they occur in
the future.
These features of the current union organizing system-
employers' frequent unfair labor practices, the delayed ratification
of employees' signed union representation cards, and the NLRA's
procedures-have all been found to unfairly prejudice unions in
their organizing efforts. They are exacerbated by the toothless and
delayed remedies provided by the NLRB,9" as well as the Board's
failure to inform employees of their rights under the NLRA.9'
Thus, in the view of organized labor, the National Labor Relations
Act is structurally inadequate to ensure that employees' wishes are
heard-indeed, the current system favors employers over unions,"
and the employee is ultimately the loser in this battle. Most
92. See Morris, supra note 9, at 527.
93. Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 4, at 1146.
94. Id.
95. Estlund, Choice, supra note 45, at 13.
96. Where the Board finds that an unfair labor practice has been committed during an
organizational campaign, it usually orders one of two remedies: a second election (which
may fail to cure the defect in the first election), or-in the most egregious cases where one-
time majority union support has been eroded through employer unfair labor practices-
requiring the employer to bargain with the union without requiring a second election
(which even then only results in a "ten percent chance of obtaining an enduring collective
bargaining relationship with the employer"). See NLRB v. Gissel Packaging Co., 395 U.S. 575,
610-14 (1969); Specter & Nguyen, supra note 91, at 318 (partially quoting Murphy, supra
note 81, at 77). Specter & Nguyen argue that these remedies are so weak because the NLRA
has been interpreted narrowly. See Spector & Nguyen, supra note 91, at 325; see also Weiler,
Promises, supra note 43, at 1789-90 (discussing the inconsistencies in NLRB remedies, which
are designed to deter certain employer conduct but often act more as a cost of doing busi-
ness, taking on a reparative function).
97. See Morris, supra note 9, at 528.
98. For an argument that union campaign donations give unions a great deal of power
over America and Americans, see EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 23.
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pessimistically put, " [o]nly when the employees' interests coincide
with those of the union or the employer do their interests get
championed, and then only secondarily and to the extent deemed
financially prudent by the union or the employer."99
III. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
Many critics argue that "the NLRB (election route) is a death
trap,"100 and a number of alternatives to the current system have
been proposed: the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), card
check, rapid or quickie elections, "Card Check 2.0," and various oth-
er substitutes. Although each of these proposals corrects some of
the inequities under the current election regime, each presents
new problems, and none level the playing field entirely or guaran-
tee that employee free choice will be protected. At the same time,
however, any attempt to rework the NLRA will be difficult due to
the "ossification of labor law," as described by Professor Cynthia
Estlund.o'0 Indeed, in her February 11, 2011 comments regarding a
House Subcommittee hearing, then-NLRB Chairman Wilma Lieb-
man appeared to agree with this analysis, noting that the NLRB has
fallen into "a long period of dormancy. 1 2 Ossification is institu-
tionalized: "for many decades, both organized labor and especially
employers have had enough support in Congress to block any sig-
nificant amendment that either group strongly opposes. "o There
is enough support to block amendments because opponents need
only "a minority that is big enough, well organized enough, and
committed enough to tie up a bill through the arcane supermajori-
ty requirements of the Senate .. . ."0' As long as powerful groups in
the Senate back both employers and unions, legislative reform will
99. Michael J. Frank, Accretion Elections: Making Employee Choice Paramount, 5 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 101, 104 (2002).
100. George Raine, A High-Stakes Labor Card Game: Organizing Strategy has Hotel Workers
Avoid Secret Ballot, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 28, 2006, at Al.
101. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1527
(2002) [hereinafter Estlund, Ossification].
102. Press Release, National Labor Relations Board, Chairman Liebman Issues State-
ment on Today's House Hearing (Feb. 11, 2011), https://www.nlrb.gov/news/chairman-
liebman-issues-statement-todays-house-hearing.
103. Estlund, Ossication, supra note 101, at 1540. To avoid a filibuster or endless
debate, Senate rules require sixty affirmative votes on a cloture motion. S. COMM. ON RULES
AND ADMIN., 111TH CONG., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE R. XX11, available at
http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?.p=RuleXXII.
104. Estlund, Ossification, supra note 101, at 1540.
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be difficult to enact. 0 Operating on the assumption that legislative
reform is possible, however, this Note addresses and critiques the
potential alternatives below.
A. Card Check
The most prominent alternative to the NLRB election process is
"card check," which would be codified under EFCA's provisions for
certifying a union.10 6 A union would be certified if a majority of
workers in the relevant bargaining unit sign authorization cards
indicating their support for that union. This system was designed
to "allow workers to complete a unionization effort before
management is aware that such an effort is underway."'o' The main
advantage of card check over the current regime is secrecy: an
employer whose workplace is being organized under the existing
NLRA is necessarily made aware of the organizing effort when the
signed cards in favor of unionization are submitted to the NLRB
(almost six weeks before the actual election takes place). In
contrast, a card check regime does not automatically inform an
employer that a union is attempting to organize its workplace-a
workforce may even be organized before the employer is aware
that a campaign has taken place.
Consistent with its backing by unions, this method of certifica-
tion is far more union-friendly than the current regime. One study
found that secret ballot elections yield a 12.7% decrease in union
support when compared to card signatures-thus, certifying un-
ions based on cards alone would increase union support by the
same percentage. 0o The AFL-CIO has consistently advocated for
card check "because people can do it off premises, can do it in
105. Id. at 1611. Estlund ultimately concludes that the most realistic way of changing
the American labor regime is to eschew the legislative process and instead to mobilize work-
ers to publicly support workers rights.
106. In addition to card check in the organizing process, EFCA would create enhanced
remedies for employer unfair labor practices during the organizing process and a system of
binding interest arbitration to secure initial collective bargaining agreements. Employee
Free Choice Act of 2009 § 3, H.R. 1409, S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009).
107. Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Un-
ion Organizing, 123 HARv. L. REv. 655, 658 (2010).
108. Laura Cooper, Authorization Cards and Union Representation Election Outcome: An Em-
pirical Assessment of the Assumption Underlying the Supreme Court's Gissel Decision, 79 Nw. U. L.
REv. 87, 122 (1984).
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their homes, can do it without the employer looking over their
shoulder."0
Unions have long understood the relationship between work-
place election success and secrecy vis-I-vis employers."o A number
of union organizing pamphlets stress that union success is often
based on employer ignorance of election campaigns, and thus en-
courage union organizers to be discreet and maintain a low
profile."' For example, the International Brotherhood of Team-
sters' Organizing Guide stresses secrecy by instructing that during
all early stages of the campaign, "the organizer's work is totally un-
derground" and should be conducted without the employer's
knowledge."' Similarly, the American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees' Organizing Model and Manual explains
their union organizing procedure in a chapter titled "Keeping the
Campaign Private."" 3 Stressing the importance of secrecy, the
manual explains that the organizer should not "tip off the employ-
er [because] [t]his is 'undercover' work.""'4 The manual also
encourages organizers to "recruit potential leaders as quietly and
quickly as [they] can" and "to constantly stress the need for secrecy
and to make assessments discreetly.""' By eliminating union elec-
tions and thus any guarantee that the employer will become aware
of the organizing effort, a card check system aids unions in their
attempts to organize workplaces, and ultimately leads to far greater
union success.
While attempting to guarantee that employees are shielded from
employer influence, card check conversely allows unions full access
to employees' decisions. In short, "card check works both by ensur-
ing a measure of secrecy [of the organizing process] vis-A-vis the
employer and by eliminating secrecy [of the employees' decisions]
vis-A-vis the union and its supporters."" Indeed, employees are
109. Anya Sostek, Union: Yes or No? As State AFL-CIO Convention Comes to Pittsburgh, Un-
ions, Employers Push for Changes to Voting Procedures, PITrSBURGH PosT-GAZETrE, Apr. 4, 2006,
at A7 (quoting Stewart Acuff, organizing director of the AFL-CIO).
110. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 65 (4th ed. 2004).
111. Id. (explaining that "[u]nions recruiting workers will generally make contact with a
small group of potential union adherents. At the early stages of a union effort this contact
may be made secretly, to make it less likely that the employer will counter-attack with anti-
union communications or unlawful reprisals."); see also Sachs, supra note 107, at 665.
112. Sachs, supra note 107, at 665 (citation omitted).
113. Id. (quoting Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Employees, Organizing Model &
Manual 1-6 (1999)).
114. Id. at 665 n.27 (quoting Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Employees, Organizing
Model & Manual 1-6 (1999)).
115. Id. (quoting Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Employees, Organizing Model &
Manual 1-11 (1999) (emphasis added)).
116. Estlund, Choice, supra note 45, at 15.
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pressured to register their support (or lack thereof) for a union by
signing (or refusing to sign) a card in front of an interested union
official. Union coercion is not the only factor influencing employ-
ee votes, however: employees will also be forced to register their
preference in front of their fellow employees, who may exert subtle
(or not-so-subtle) group pressure on the individual to sign or re-
frain from signing a union authorization card.1
Thus, support for the card check system assumes that union of-
ficials and fellow employees are indifferent as to employee support
and would not pressure or coerce employees. In reality, however,
unions and their officials' jobs depend on collecting dues from
new members."8 The premise for card check fails to recognize that
employees may sign cards "due to social pressure, misunderstand-
ing, or outright coercion.""9 Accordingly, employees who prefer
not to be represented by a union may nonetheless sign an authori-
zation card merely to avoid retaliation should the union eventually
be certified. 2 0 Under these circumstances, it is unclear whether
voter-workers actually prefer union representation.
Even card check proponents have argued that secret ballot elec-
tions are a superior means of measuring employee preference-
when it works in unions' favor. Congressman George Miller and
fifteen of his colleagues sent a letter to the Mexican Labor Board
stressing the necessity of elections in February 2001, explaining:
"the secret ballot is absolutely necessary in order to ensure that
workers are not intimidated into voting for a union they might not
otherwise choose." 2' Unions have made similar arguments in the
context of decertifying (or voting to oust) a union. The AFL-CIO
has argued to the NLRB that "other means of decision-making are
'not comparable to the privacy and independence of the voting
booth,' and [the secret ballot] election system provides the surest
means of avoiding decisions which are 'the result of group pres-
sures and not individual decision [s].' ,122 Former Democratic
117. See, e.g., NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 E2d 562, 566 (4th Cir. 1967); GOULD,
AGENDA, supra note 3, at 163.
118. See Specter& Nguyen, supra note 91, at 319.
119. Sachs, supra note 107, at 669.
120. See EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 47-48 (calling this "[s]trategic surrender").
121. Letter from U.S. Rep. George Miller et. al., to Junta Local de Conciliacion y
Arbitrraje del Estado de Puebla (Aug. 29, 2001), available at http://
www.boulettegolden.com/EFCAMexicoLetter.pdf.
122. Assoc. OF SENIOR HUMAN RES. EXEC., MISTITLED "EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT"
WOULD STRIP WORKERS OF SECRET BALLOT IN UNION REPRESENTATION DECISIONS 2 (2004)
(quotingJoint Brief of the AFL-CIO et al. at 13, in Chelsea Industries & Levitz Furniture Co.
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Senator George McGovern pointedly acknowledged this incon-
sistency in an August 2008 Wall Street Journal op-ed:
To my friends supporting EFCA I say this: We cannot be a par-
ty that strips working Americans of the right to a secret-ballot
election. We are the party that has always defended the rights
of the working class. To fail to ensure the right to vote free of
intimidation and coercion from all sides would be a betrayal
of what we have always championed.2
Indeed, experience demonstrates that employees cannot risk re-
fusing to sign a card for a union that may later be certified, and
thus union retribution and peer pressure can seriously undermine
employee choice. In Randell Warehouse of Arizona, Inc.,'" the NLRB
found that union agents and supporters illegally threatened and
coerced employees to influence their vote in a union election'" by
causing "[a] reasonable employee [to] anticipate that the union
would not be pleased if he or she failed to respond affirmatively to
the union's efforts to enlist support," and thus violated employee
free choice. 2 , Similarly, in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.," union offi-
cials threatened employees "that those possessing 'a Local 1547
membership card would be in an extremely favorable priority posi-
,,128 129 unotion' compared to nonmembers .... In HCF Inc., a union
member told an employee that "the Union would come and get
her children and it would also slash her car tires" if she did not
sign a union authorization card.2 0
Union organizers corroborated many of these claims at a recent
hearing before the House Subcommittee on Health, Employment,
Labor and Pensions. Jennifer Jason, a former union organizer for
123. George McGovern, My Party Should Respect Secret Union Ballots, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8,
2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121815502467222555.html.
124. 347 N.L.R.B. 591 (2006).
125. Id. In Randell, union representatives took photos of employees either accepting or
refusing to accept union campaign literature. Id. For a similar situation, see Mike Yurosek &
Son, Inc., 292 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1074 (1989) (finding that unexplained videotaping combined
with the statement, "We've got it on film; we know who you guys are . .. after the Union wins
the election some of you may not be here" led employees to reasonably fear reprisal); Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 736, 736 (1988) (videotaping found objectionable as inter-
fering with employee free choice).
126. Randell, 347 N.L.R.B. at 594.
127. 261 N.L.R.B. 125 (1982).
128. Id. at 125. For a similar union threat made during union decertification proce-
dures, see Healthcare Employees Union, Local 399, 333 N.L.R.B. 1399, 1399 (2001) (union
representatives were found to have threatened employees that they would be outsourced if
the union were decertified).
129. 321 N.L.R.B. 1320 (1996).
130. Id. at 1320.
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UNITE HERE, explained that she was trained to create a sense of
agitation in workers and to capitalize on the "heat of the mo-
ment."'3 Yet the most striking testimony came from Ricardo Torres
at the same hearing, who admitted that "[v]isits to the homes of
employees who didn't support the union were used to frustrate
them and put them in fear of what might happen to them, their
family, or homes if they didn't change their minds about the un-
ion."
This is not intended to suggest that unions coerce employees
more than employers, or that their unfair labor practices are any
more reprehensible. Rather, it illustrates a point often ignored in
scholarly literature: that secrecy vis-i-vis employers, but not union
officials, is not the answer to the NLRA's problems. Union officials,
like employers, have been shown to deceive, coerce, and threaten
employees. Secrecy may even prevent employees from expressing
their preferences-union officials will steer clear of workers who
are known to be anti-union or who support another union to avoid
alerting them of the union's organizing efforts. Thus, not only will
employers be silenced, but the persuasive voices of large numbers
of employees may be silenced as well 33 :
The defenders of EFCA say little or nothing to justify the pos-
sibility of a union preventing dissenting workers from having
a voice in the democratic process that the representation elec-
tions afford to a union. It is a profound irony that a statute
that purports to empower workers to exercise their "free
choice" . . . disenfranchises a potentially large fraction of
them. 34
Thus, the card check regime designed to protect employee
choice may not accurately reflect the employees' eventual consen-
sus that would result from a robust exchange of views within the
workplace.'35 This has long been understood. In NLRB v. S.S. Logan
Packing Co., the court recognized that "[t]he unreliability of the
cards is . . . inherent, as we have noted, in the absence of secrecy
and the natural inclination of most people to avoid stands which
appear to be nonconformist and antagonistic to friends and fellow
131. See Strengthening America's Middle Class, supra note 46, at 31-33 (prepared statement
ofJenniferJason).
132. Id. at 7.
133. See EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 43.
134. Id. at 44.
135. The benefits of an informed "electorate" hearing opposing views is perhaps best
exemplified in the 1954 CBS teleplay, 12 Angry Men, where a lone man manages to change
the minds of eleven other jurors during deliberations.
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employees."'3  Empirical evidence confirms the cards'
unreliability: where two unions have concurrently organized the
same workforce, employees frequently sign cards indicating their
support for both unions. This inherent unreliability may be
compounded, as card check proposals lack a contemporaneous
oversight of the card solicitation process and unions maintain con-
trol over the cards until they are submitted to the NLRB. Moreover,
employees who later change their minds may have no adequate
means to withdraw or revoke their signed cards, so these cards may
be submitted to the NLRB despite being contrary to employees'
wishes.138
Even where signed union authorization cards initially represent
the employees' desire for union representation (and not merely a
request for an NLRB election), twenty-five percent of those who
initially sign union authorization cards later vote against unioniza-
tion, perhaps "represent[ing] a more considered, if not more
informed, judgment."'" For these reasons, card check alone is not
a suitable alternative to the NLRA, as it replaces one extreme with
another.4 1
B. Expedited Elections
An expedited NLRB election process presents another alterna-
tive to the current system and retains the secret ballot election.
Indeed, the NLRB is currently considering adopting this model. 4'
Under this option, rapid or quickie elections would be conducted
136. NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 566 (4th Cir. 1967). Importantly,
this was acknowledged and quoted by ChiefJustice Earl Warren in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575, 602 n.20 (1969).
137. See GOULD, AGENDA, supra note 3, at 162-63.
138. For example, an employee who requests his card's return may be told that his card
was destroyed. In this case, the employee will lack a means of ensuring that his revoked card
is not later submitted as evidence of union support. For reasons explaining why this phe-
nomenon is acceptable under the current system, see NLRB, OUTLINE, supra note 27, at 46-
47 ("A showing of interest is not subject to attack on the ground that the cards on which it is
based have been revoked or withdrawn. 'Such an attack,' said the Board, 'has no bearing on
the validity of the original showing but merely raises the question as to whether particular
employees have changed their minds about union representation. That question can best be
resolved on the basis of an election by secret ballot.'" (internal quotations omitted)).
139. GETMAN, supra note 67, at 153.
140. For a discussion of how the EFCA fails to establish a "tight relationship between
the supposed wrong [employer unfair labor practices] and the curative legislation [card
check, increased employer unfair labor practice penalties, and mandatory first contract
arbitration]," see EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 18-20.
141. See National Labor Relations Board Representation-Case Procedures, 76 Fed.
Reg. 36,812-47 (June 22, 2011).
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soon after the pre-election hearing; according to dissenting Board
member Brian E. Hayes, the election could be held as few as ten to
twenty-one days after the filing of the election petition.' 2 A secret
ballot election arguably provides a number of benefits to a union:
A secret ballot vote has a symbolic value that a card check can
never have. It clears the air of any doubts about the unions'
majority and also confers a measure of legitimacy on the un-
ion's bargaining authority, especially among minority pockets
of employees who were never contacted in the initial organi-
zational drive."'
In addition to this system's symbolic value, it provides practical val-
ue over card check by preventing employees from being bound by
union authorization cards that they signed due to peer pressure, or
whose meaning they misunderstood.
The main argument for quickie elections instead of the current
system, however, is that it makes it "nearly impossible" for the em-
ployer to engage in unfair labor practices that cause unions to lose
elections.14 4 While rendering employer unfair labor practices "near-
ly impossible," this short window also makes any employer (and
anti-union employees') statements "nearly impossible," meaning
that employees may not be fully informed. As Weiler explains:
It would be unthinkable to structure an electoral system in
such a way that one political party, having carefully established
its support among the electorate, could unilaterally trigger a
snap election at a favorable moment and thereby rob the oth-
er party of any chance to compete in the race. For precisely
the same reasons, the bill's detractors contended, 'instant
elections' should be anathema in the union certification
context. 145
142. Id. at 36,831 ("What is certain is that the proposed rules will (1) substantially
shorten the time between the filing of the petition and the election date, and (2) substan-
tially limit the opportunity for full evidentiary hearing or Board review on contested issues
involving, among other things, appropriate unit, voter eligibility, and election misconduct.
Thus, by administrative fiat in lieu of Congressional action, the Board will impose organized
labor's much sought-after 'quickie election' option, a procedure under which elections will
be held in 10 to 21 days from the filing of the petition."). As many critics have pointed out,
however, quickie elections rely on increased Board efficiency that does not now exist. See, e.g.,
Befort, supra note 1, at 352; Specter & Nguyen, supra note 91, at 324.
143. Weiler, Promises, supra note 43, at 1811-12.
144. Id. at 1812.
145. Id. at 1813.
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Although the reform seeks to limit employer unfair labor prac-
tices, its effect will likely be "to minimize, or rather, to effectively
eviscerate an employer's legitimate opportunity to express its views
about collective bargaining."4" This conflicts with the. 1947 Taft-
Hartley amendments to the NLRA, whose stated purpose in part
was to "insure both to employers and labor organizations full free-
dom to express their views to employees on labor matters."'4 7 As the
Supreme Court recently recognized, Congress made "[a] policy
judgment, which suffuses the NLRA as a whole, as 'favoring unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open debate . . . ."'4 Indeed, a number of
speakers at the Board's open hearing on expedited elections ar-
gued that the Board's proposed rules "would prevent or impede a
free and reasoned choice by the electorate," especially because a
number of small employers cannot get in touch with attorneys,
gather information, and prepare for the union campaign in this
limited time period."' Thus, expedited elections inappropriately
prioritize speed over the NLRA's other important purposes.
C. Card Check 2.0
Although expedited elections and the Employee Free Choice
Act remain the most widely debated statutory reforms being con-
sidered today, scholars have proposed other ways of amending the
NLRA. Harvard Law School labor law professor Benjamin Sachs
has proposed two alternatives, which he calls "Card Check 2.0."
These proposals are "asymmetry-correcting altering rules," prem-
ised on the idea that workplaces (and thus workers) must be union
or nonunion by default.'5o Borrowing from the preference-eliciting
default theory of statutory interpretation"5 and the reversible de-
146. Dissenting View of Member Brian E. Hayes, NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 77 (June 22, 2011), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/525/dissent.pdf.
147. S. Rep No. 105, at 23 (1947).
148. Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 68 (2008) (citations omitted).
149. NLRB Opens Hearing on Election Rules, Debate Centers on Need for Amendments, 137
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at AA-1 (July 18, 2011), available at http://news.bna.com/
dlln/DLLNWB/splitdisplay.adp?fedfid=21329255&vname=dlrnotallissues&fn=21329255&jd
=a0c8m2z5k2&split=0.
150. Sachs, supra note 107, at 659.
151. As defined by Sachs, the preference-eliciting default theory does not require the
judiciary to adopt the statutory interpretation that it believes to have the greatest amount of
public support; rather, it "requires courts to choose the interpretation that would be
disfavored by the party to the interpretive debate with the greatest capacity to force the
legislature to correct an erroneous interpretation." Sachs, supra note 107, at 674.
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fault theory of corporate law,' Sachs explains that the default rule
for unionization should be that from which it is easiest to depart
(the nonunion default)' 3 and should protect the party that would
have more difficulty changing the status quo (workers) .
Under one of Sachs' proposed reforms, employees could cast
their secret ballots over the phone or via the internet.1' Under an
alternative suggested reform, secret ballots could be submitted at
regulated polling sites or through mail ballot voting at any time.5 6
Unlike card check proposals, Sachs' models maintain secrecy of
employee choice vis-A-vis both the employer and the union by
providing for an election where votes can be cast in secrecy. This is
arguably a superior option because it accounts for the persuasive
abilities (the "epistemological authority") 5 7 of trained union or-
ganizers, and attempts to correct for the problem that employees
might vote to please others rather than because of their own pref-
erences.
Although these theories will be considered in Part V's reform,
they have not gained the full approval of either the labor move-
ment or management, and are subject to some of the weaknesses
of card check. While praising the secrecy of Sachs' model, Estlund
notes that "Sachs himself ... offer [s] perhaps the strongest argu-
ment for openness" in arguing that asymmetry-correcting rules are
necessary in the first place.'5
In practice, telephonic and electronic voting may not be as "se-
cret" as the voting conducted at a ballot box. Indeed, one can
imagine a union election "party" where attendance is monitored
and employees are encouraged (or coerced) to cast e-ballots or
vote telephonically for union representation in the presence of
union organizers. The converse is likewise possible. Under the
152. In the corporate context, the reversible default theory holds that:
[W]henever there is uncertainty over the identity of the value-maximizing arrange-
ment, a preference should generally be given to the alternative that is more
restrictive of managers. This restrictive alternative would be reversed if it turns out to
be value decreasing [and left in place if not], whereas the alternative favored by man-
agers would remain in place if chosen as default even if it turned out to be value
decreasing.
Id. at 678. Thus, Sachs argues that both the preference-eliciting default theory of statutory
interpretation and the reversible default theory of corporate law are designed to facilitate
change in unpopular laws.
153. Id. at 658-59.
154. Id. at 658-59, 676 ("favor the politically weak").
155. Id. at 663.
156. Sachs, supra note 107, at 663.
157. Id. at 662.
158. Estlund, Choice, supra note 45, at 18.
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Railway Labor Act,'5 9 which governs representation elections in the
railroad and airline industries, electronic voting already occurs. On
December 8, 2010, the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers filed a claim of election interference against
Delta Airlines based in part on Delta's alleged ability to monitor
employee voting from company computers.'6o
D. Other Alternatives
Another reform, proposed by Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Barry T.
Hirsch, professors at the University of Tennessee College of Law
and Georgia State University, respectively, advocates eliminating
the NLRA's "company union" prohibition, which limits the ability
of employers to create work groups. They argue that legalizing
company unions would facilitate "welfare-enhancing employee
voice and participation" and make employer-employee dialogue
easier. 62 Admitting that their proposal could make union organiz-
ing more difficult, Hirsch and Hirsch contend that allowing
company unions to compete with traditional unions could lead to
innovation and more responsive representation, ultimately giving
employees more choice and better representation.'6 3 Hirsch and
Hirsch conclude with what has been forgotten in much of the re-
cent literature: that the goal of labor law should be facilitating
employee choice and increasing worker satisfaction, which should
not be measured solely in terms of union density.6 4
Another alternative presented by Henry Drummonds proposes
allowing the states themselves to determine the union organizing
processes in their respective jurisdictions. Hirsch and Hirsch se-
cond this option, arguing that the states could act as laboratories
for the nation by developing and testing new labor laws. The states
165that develop systems that enhance worker welfare will be copied,
and systems that are too costly to employers or provide too few
benefits to workers will be displaced by more responsive systems.
159. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (2006).
160. 1AM Charges Delta Air Lines with Election Interference, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS (LAM) (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.jointheiam.org/
?p=810.
161. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006).
162. Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 4, at 1152. For another argument that this is a viable
model to increase worker voice, see Befort, supra note 1, at 411-15.
163. See Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 4, at 1165.
164. Id.





The main problem with many of these reforms is that in at-
tempting to "even the playing field" between unions and
employers, these proposals unfairly prejudice the employer. They
fail to recognize that privileging unions' knowledge and access to
employees may sometimes be at the expense of employee choice
itself-the very choice that Section 7 of the NLRA and these alter-
natives are designed to protect. Reforms should not sacrifice
employee choice to either union or employer pressure, but rather
should protect employee privacy and the decision to "engage in" or
"refrain from" union activity and support. For this reason, the re-
forms presented in Part V of this Note are a superior alternative for
amending the NLRA.
IV. THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
Canada's is perhaps the closest analog to the United States' la-
bor relations system. The neighboring countries developed in
parallel and now possess similar geographic and economic circum-
stances.'"' Moreover, their industrial relations systems are similar,
and many of the same "international" trade unions operate in both
countries. Canadian unionization rates, however, have remained
relatively constant while American unionization rates have de-
creased. 169
Unlike the single federal system under the NLRA in the United
States, Canada's federal and ten provincial systems each employ
different procedures for certifying labor unions that can be divided
into two different basic systems: a card-based majority certification
regime and a secret ballot vote certification regime.o Four prov-
inces (Manitoba, New Brunswick, Quebec, and Prince Edward
Island) as well as the federal jurisdiction allow labor unions to be
certified by virtue of a card majority that varies in each jurisdiction:
167. See, e.g., GOULD, AGENDA, supra note 3, at 205; Weiler, Promises, supra note 43, at
1819.
168. GOULD, AGENDA, supra note 3, at 205; Weiler, Promises, supra note 43, at 1819.
169. See Marcel Boyer, Union Certification: Developing a Level Playing Field for Labour Rela-
tions in Quebec, MONTREAL EcON. INST. RES. PAPERS 9 (2009), available at http://
www.iedm.org/files/september09_en_0.pdf (explaining that while the American union
density rate has decreased from 22.3% in 1980 to 11.6% in 2007, the Canadian union densi-
ty rate remained fairly constant, at 34.0% in 1980, and falling to 24.9% in 2007). For a year-
by-year analysis of unionization rates in the two countries, see GOULD, AGENDA, supra note 3,
at 210-11.
170. See Boyer, supra note 169, at 14; Doorey, supra note 85, at 81-83.
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more than fifty percent in the federal jurisdiction, Quebec, and
Prince Edward Island; more than sixty percent in New Brunswick;
and sixty-five percent in Manitoba. Even when these thresholds are
not met, however, unions may be certified through secret ballot
elections, which establish lower thresholds for the percentage of
employees who must submit cards, but require a majority of the
employees who cast ballots in the secret ballot election to vote in
favor of union representation."'
The Canadian card check system is designed to provide an extra
level of protection to employees: employees are not only required
to sign an authorization card, but must also apply for union mem-
bership and pay a nominal fee" to emphasize the consequences
(financial and otherwise) of their signatures.1" At the same time,
Canadian law does not protect employee choice completely-
union authorization cards are generally irrevocable, allowing some
unions to become certified without the requisite employee sup-
port. Even where "a sizeable segment of current employees" have
petitioned the Board that they have since changed their minds and
no longer desire representation, this may be insufficient to prevent
the union's certification. 174
The six remaining provinces (Alberta, British Columbia, New-
foundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Ontario, and
Saskatchewan), which cover approximately seventy-five percent of
the Canadian workforce,17 5 all require that a union be elected by a
majority of secret ballot votes to become certified. Each jurisdic-
tion requires a different percentage of signed authorization cards
in order to trigger the mandatory secret ballot election: forty per-
cent in Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, and Ontario;
forty-five percent in British Columbia and Saskatchewan; and fifty
percent in Alberta. 7 6
171. See Canada Labour Code, R.S.C., c. L-2 §§ 29-31 (1985); Manitoba Labour Rela-
tions Act, C.C.S.M., c. L-10 § 40(1) (2004); New Brunswick Industrial Relations Act, R.S.N.B.
c. 1-4 § 14 (1973); Prince Edward Island Labour Act, R.S.P.E.I., c. IA § 13 (1988); Quebec
Labour Code, R.S.Q., c. C-27 § 28 (1985).
172. Doorey, supra note 85, at 82. For example, in Alberta, the fee is C$2.00.
173. See PAUL WEILER, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN CANADIAN LA-
BOUR LAw 37 (1980) [hereinafter WEILER, RECONCILABLE].
174. Murphy, supra note 81, at 83 (citation omitted).
175. Chris Riddell, Union Certification Success Under Voting Versus Card-Check Procedures: Ev-
idence from British Columbia, 1978-1998, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 493, 494 (2004).




Although these two different basic systems can be analyzed sepa-
rately, British Columbia's experience serves as a laboratory for the
debate between the card check process and secret ballot elections.
From its inception, British Columbia allowed unions to become
certified through card check procedures. In 1984, the British Co-
lumbia legislature introduced a new election requirement,'
mandating that it be conducted within ten days of the cards' sub-
mission.7  In 1993,"' the legislature repealed the election
requirement and re-implemented the original card check proce-
dure.80
Chris Riddell studied over 6,500 private sector union elections in
British Columbia between 1978 and 1998 to analyze the effect of
the two methods on union certification success. '8 When unions
were required to be elected by a majority of the secret ballots cast
between 1984 and 1992, union success declined by nineteen per-
cent, which Riddell attributed entirely to the requirement for
secret ballot elections. 82 Moreover, Riddell found that manage-
ment opposition (as measured by unfair labor practice complaints)
was twice as effective under the election regime, yet ultimately ac-
counted for only a quarter of the decline in the unionization rate
during this period. 3
B. Quickie Elections
Five Canadian provinces provide for quickie elections that must
occur within five to ten days.'84 Legal scholars have praised these
elections:
177. See British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard (May 16, 1984), at 4803 (re-
cording the vote results for Bill 28, Labour Code Amendment Act).
178. See Riddell, supra note 175, at 495.
179. See British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard No. 6 (Nov. 12, 1992), at 4009
(recording the vote results for Bill 84, Labour Relations Code).
180. See Riddell, supra note 175, at 494-95.
181. Id. at 494. Thus, Riddell's study includes six years of data under a card check re-
gime, followed by nine years of data under a mandatory secret ballot regime, followed by
another six years of card check data.
182. Id. at 509.
183. Id.
184. In Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia, a secret ballot election must oc-
cur within five days of the submission of union authorization cards. Newfoundland and
Labrador Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.L., c. L-1 § 47 (1990) ("Where a vote is taken it shall
be taken no more than 5 days, excluding holidays and weekends after receipt by the board
of the application for certification."); Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, R.S.N.S., c. 475 § 25
(1989) ("Normally the Board shall conduct the vote [ ..] no more than five working days
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If a union wins, not only does it get certification from the
board, but it does so upon a footing which carries more cred-
ibility and legitimacy than automatic certification on the basis
of cards . . .. If the union does lose an election conducted at a
time of its own choosing, then its support among employees
was sufficiently soft that it is far better off not getting involved
in a fruitless, first-contract negotiation struggle."'
Quickie elections have been viewed as an effective compromise:
[i]n this highly compressed interval, it is nearly impossible for the
employer to mount a sustained offensive aimed at turning employ-
ee sentiments around through intimidation and discrimination."1 6
Although quickie elections do not entirely eliminate employer re-
sistance to unionization, they have been effective in both reducing
illegal conduct and its impact on union support to levels much
lower than those existing during representation elections in the
United States."
C. Conclusions from the Canadian Experience
Of the four largest provinces in Canada (Alberta, British Co-
lumbia, Ontario, and Quebec), Quebec has the most lenient labor
organization rules: it alone allows for union certification without a
secret ballot election, and its minimum threshold of signed union
authorization cards to require an election is lower than those in
other provinces (thirty-five percent in Quebec, forty percent in
Ontario and Alberta, and forty-five percent in British Columbia).'
Moreover, union authorization cards or petitions are valid for the
longest period of time in Quebec (signatures are valid for twelve
months in Quebec, six months in Ontario, and ninety days in Brit-
after receipt by the Board of the application and three working days after the Board's notic-
es are received by the employer."). In Ontario, the election must be held within five to eight
days. Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O., c. 1 § 8 (1995) ("[W]ithin five days (excluding
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays) after the day on which the application for certification is
filed with the Board."). In Manitoba, the election must be held within seven days. Manitoba
Labour Relations Act, C.C.S.M., c. L-10 § 48(3) (2004) ("[W]ithin seven days after the day
on which the application for certification is filed with the board."). In British Columbia, the
election must be held within ten days. British Columbia Labour Relations Code, R.S.B.C., c.
244 § 24 (1996) ("[W]ithin 10 days from the date the board receives the application for
certification.").
185. WElLER, RECONCILABLE, supra note 173, at 45.
186. WEILER, Promises, supra note 43, at 1812.
187. See Terry Thomason, The Effect of Accelerated Certification Procedures on Union Organiz-
ing Success in Ontario, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 207, 224 (1994).
188. Boyer, supra note 169, at 16.
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ish Columbia and Alberta).'" Despite Quebec's pro-labor legisla-
tion, however, in a 2006 opinion poll commissioned by the Conseil
du patronat du Qu6bec, seventy-nine percent of all Quebecers and
eighty-three percent of unionized workers supported requiring a
secret ballot election for unions to become certified.o90
The most ringing endorsement of the secret ballot came during
Ontario's legislative debates, concluding in Ontario's adoption of a
mandatory secret ballot regime. During the hearings, a legislator
read aloud from a Guelph worker's letter:
I have been manipulated by unions and businesses alike dur-
ing 20 working years ... . If you truly want workers to exert
control over their own destinies, give them the right to a se-
cret ballot vote whenever possible. By making this a
mandatory provision, you will force businesses and unions
alike to ensure that the workers receive all of the information
necessary to make an informed decision. This provision will
... advance the interests of working people, . . . make the
workplace more open, responsive and democratic and ...
eliminate threats to these worthy goals.'9 '
The letter concluded by requesting that legislators defer to the
ability of "working people to make rational decisions when provid-
ed with complete, factual information."9 2
V. PROPOSED REFORM
Lessons emerge from experiences under both the Canadian and
American models. First, the reliability of union authorization cards
must be questioned, as evidenced by the prevalence with which
employees join the same union multiple times and sign union au-
thorization cards for rival unions.'9 3 Second, Section 7 of the NLRA
provides a balanced approach toward employee choice: to join or
not join a union. Just as union advocates argue that a secret ballot
is necessary in the decertification context to ensure that
189. Id.
190. Id. at 7.
191. Ontario, Bill 76 Debate (An Act to Amend the Labour Relations Act) (Nov. 5,
1992), at 1050 (statement of Mrs. Elizabeth Whitmer), available at http://www.ontla.on.ca/
web/house-proceedings/house_detail.do?Date=1992-11-05&Parl=35&Sess=2&locale=fr.
192. Id.
193. See Boyer, supra note 169, at 17.
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employee wishes are protected,9 4 it is important to maintain the
same attitude towards free choice for or against unionization in the
certification process.
The prevalence of unfair labor practices committed by both un-
ions and management, including coercion and distortions,
requires that the NLRB become more involved in the union certi-
fication process. To ensure that both unions and employers are
able to express their views and thus provide employees with the
tools necessary to make an informed decision, Congress should
amend the NLRA to replace the current organizing regime with a
new process under which (1) unions must file a notice with the
NLRB prior to commencing a fixed sixty-day card-signing cam-
paign, with unions subject to harsh penalties if they commence
organizing efforts prior to this time; (2) a standardized union au-
thorization card, effective for that limited sixty-day duration, must
be submitted with one month's union dues from each employee as
an indication of support for unionization; and (3) the NLRB estab-
lishes a verification or revocation process for these cards.
A. First Prong: Sixty-Day Organizing Period
The first prong of this reform-requiring unions to file with the
NLRB prior to commencing a sixty-day card-signing campaign and
subjecting unions to harsh penalties for 'jumping the gun"-is de-
signed to achieve a number of goals. First, mandatory disclosures
ensure that unions cannot take advantage of an employer's igno-
rance to garner employee support through misstatements.
Although it has been argued that "the employer does not need the
same opportunity that the union needs in order to speak about
representation of the workforce [because it] has had ample oppor-
tunity to demonstrate [its] ability to represent the employees'
interests,"' it is important that an employer be made aware that its
workplace is being unionized so that it may correct union mis-
statements. This open approach is also important to establish the
union's legitimacy at the bargaining table and to start building a
relationship between the union and employer. This disclosure
194. Assoc. oF SENIOR HUMAN RES. EXEC., MISTITLED "EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT"
WOULD STRIP WORKERS OF SECRET BALLOT IN UNION REPRESENTATION DECISIONS 2 (2004)
(quotingJoint Brief of the AFL-CIO et al. at 13, in Chelsea Industries & Levitz Furniture Co.
of the Pacific, Inc. (N.L.R.B. May 18, 1998) (Nos. 7-CA-36846, 7-CA-37016, 20-CA-326596),
available at http://www.hrpolicy.org/memoranda/2004/04-10_EmployeereeChoice
ActPB.pdf.
195. Murphy, supra note 81, at 92.
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would similarly alert anti-union employees, so that they could
communicate with their fellow employees and feel that their voice
was heard during the unionizing process. These workers will be
bound by the terms contained in any collective bargaining agree-
ment if the union is successful and should have the opportunity to
* * 196express their opinions during the union campaign.
Limiting the duration of the union campaign to sixty days would
also have positive economic and social effects. The period would
begin after the Board sends an employer notice of the campaign
and bargaining unit issues are settled. In order to ensure that
technical or administrative issues are resolved quickly, the Board
could establish a seven-day guideline: the main issue would be
whether the union's proposed bargaining unit is an appropriate
unit. Within this timeline, the employer would also be required to
submit its Excelsior list of employees' names and addresses for
Board and union use. When these two matters are settled, the sixty-
day period would begin, and both the employer and the union
could begin communicating their views to employees.
Likewise, this limited period would be beneficial because unions
would not waste resources on workplaces where employees have
little desire for unionization. Workers who are subjected to union
pressure to sign authorization cards would know that the end is in
sight. This reform is not a novel idea; labor advocate Paul Weiler
previously suggested that the NLRB "mandat[e] a limited period in
which the cards will be accepted as a demonstration of employee
support for the union. Little cause would then exist for doubting
the reliability of the cards as indicators of present employee de-
sires."19 7 Penalties against unions who violated either of these rules
would help ensure that the rules are followed so that employers,
unions, and employees could have confidence in NLRB oversight
and the unionizing process itself.'9"
A possible critique of this approach is that unions would file
scattershot petitions at multiple workplaces in a mad rush to organ-
ize, even where they do not intend to organize these workplaces
and the workers have expressed no desire for union representa-
tion. This is unlikely to occur for three reasons: first, unions have
limited resources, and it would be inefficient to expend the time
and money to file a petition for a workforce that the union had no
serious intent to organize. Second, the one-year bar imposed on
196. See EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 43.
197. Murphy, supra note 81, at 90.
198. For example, penalties might include dismissal of the union's organizing demand
and a bar on submitting any new demand at that workplace for six months.
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unsuccessful attempts to organize (discussed in prong three)
would deter this kind of conduct, as it could prevent any union
from organizing a workforce that later desired union representa-
tion. Finally, unions would want to avoid a record of failure with
the Board and the public. 99
In conjunction with these reforms, however, union authorization
cards should not be the final indicia of employee desire. The lack
of transparency in ensuring that employees are allowed to with-
draw or revoke their authorization cards200 does little to assure
employers or workers of the union's legitimacy. Requiring unions
to return union authorization cards to employees upon request
would enhance the union's legitimacy in the eyes of both employ-
ees and the employer. This reform is also not novel: Paul Weiler
also argued for a "return date" for union cards, recognizing that
employees may be "sweet talked by a smooth union organizer" or
caught up in sudden peer-pressure and not have the time to reflect
on the decision they are making.20 ' Thus, "a case can be made for
giving the employees some legal opportunity for second thoughts,
so that they are satisfied and their true feelings about collective
bargaining have been expressed.,,202 The Board could explain these
revocation rights in a letter or posting to employees when the sixty-
day campaign commences.
B. Second Prong: Standard Union Authorization Card
The second prong of this reform, establishing a standard union
authorization card and requiring that employees sign this card and
pay a set fee, would be an important step in ensuring that the card
authorization process reflects employee preference. In the US
Congressional Hearings concerning the Employee Free Choice
Act, a number of employees revealed that they did not understand
the significance of the card (or petition) that they signed, believing
that they were only signing a card to receive more information
199. It might ultimately also strengthen unions by encouraging greater coordination so
that they do not pursue competing target employers and industries. This might lead to both
stronger individual unions (via possible mergers into a larger and stronger labor organiza-
tion) and a particular union's individual focus on specific targeted industries. Thus, the
United Auto Workers might be expected to direct their resources toward auto manufactur-
ers and parts suppliers. The United Auto Workers' success in organizing would provide it
greater density in that industry and the resulting leverage to obtain improved wages, bene-
fits and working conditions. This would lead to further success in organizing and a far
stronger overall labor movement.
200. See NLRB, OUTLINE, supra note 27, at 42.




about the union.203 This problem of ambiguous or misleading au-
thorization cards could be remedied "quite simply by creating a
uniform authorization card. A carefully-worded model card
developed and issued by the Board would eliminate any questions
concerning the possible misinterpretation of the cards.,0o
Moreover, the Canadian requirement that employees pay a fee
in addition to signing an authorization card should be grafted onto
the American model. The fee would impress upon employees the
importance of their decision,2 0 ' reinforce the idea that unionizing
has costs as well as benefits, and discourage employees from sign-
ing multiple union authorization cards. Although Canadian
jurisdictions only require that a nominal fee of between C$1.00
and C$5.00 be paid,o6 the fee under the US model should be suffi-
cient to impress upon workers the importance of their decision,
such as one month's union dues at the rate the union would
charge for the duration of any first labor agreement. The NLRB's
uniform authorization card could also be designed to explain any
initiation fees, monthly dues, and other union fees to ensure that
this information is accurately presented to employees in making
their decisions. The Board's process and enforcement of dues as
written on the card would thus ensure that the union accurately
represents its cost structure and that all employees in a bargaining
unit are given the same information.
The requirement that union authorization cards expire after the
sixty-day organizing drive would similarly reflect employees' cur-
rent desires. If authorization cards last indefinitely, employees may
be unaware that their cards could serve as evidence of a work-
force's desire for union representation despite having been signed
months ago and forgotten. Moreover, expiration ensures that un-
ion authorization cards indicate current union support, a policy
that underlies the National Labor Relations Act certification pro-
cess. Finally, the automatic expiration of union authorization cards
may be the best way of reflecting employee expectations-it is un-
likely that workers expect these cards to remain effective after a
union organizing drive fails.
203. See, e.g., Strengthening America's Middle Class, supra note 46, at 5-6 (prepared state-
ment of Karen M. Mayhew).
204. Murphy, supra note 81, at 94.
205. See WEILER, RECONCILABLE, supra note 173, at 42.
206. Id. Weiler argues that these amounts "should be raised to make it a more realistic
device in securing the purpose for which the payment was designed." Id.
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C. Third Prong: Card Revocation
The final prong of the reform requires that the National Labor
Relations Board validate these union authorization cards. If a ma-
jority of the workers in the appropriate bargaining unit submitted
a union authorization card and paid one month's dues to the
Board during the sixty-day organizing period, the union will be
"conditionally certified." The Board would then send a letter to
employees (using the Excelsior list previously provided by the
Board by the employer excluding any terminations provided by the
employer to the NLRB during the sixty-day period) to give them
the opportunity to exercise in private their right to opt for no
union representation. This not only encourages the employer to
provide an accurate Excelsior list, but also forces the employer to
notify the Board (which would then advise the union) of any ter-
minations during the card signing period, and-with the threat of
an unfair labor practice charge looming-thereby discourages an
employer from discharging employees for their union activity. The
NLRB's letter would inform employees that they have twenty days
to vote against the union's pending certification via computer to
the NLRB's secure website for that specific election, via telephone
at an NLRB telephone number designated for that election, or by
returning a signed, pre-posted card (included in the letter to the
employee) to the NLRB stating that the employee does not wish to
be represented by the union. To prevent fraud, an employee who
chooses to vote against union representation online or by tele-
phone will be required to enter a unique personal "pin number"
or "code" contained in the NLRB's letter.
Employees will be given twenty days from the date the letter is
mailed to register their preference to not be represented by the
union; employees who desire union representation need not act.
At the end of the twenty-day period (including time for post-
marked ballots) the NLRB will assess how many "no" votes it
received. If the no votes equal fifty percent or more of the bargain-
ing unit (as measured by then-current employees from the
Excelsior list), the conditional certification is revoked. If less than
fifty percent of the bargaining unit votes against representation,
the union is certified.
To ensure that these employee votes are private and not the re-
sult of undue union or employer influence, it must be an unfair
labor practice for an employer or union to inquire about or review
an employee's response to the revocation letter sent by the NLRB.
Section 8(a) (1) of the NLRA currently would be interpreted to do
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so regarding employers, but Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA
should be amended to clarify that it is also an unfair labor practice
for a union to inquire about or review an employee's actions re-
garding the revocation letter or card .o
Thus, it would be illegal for a union to host an event where it in-
vited employees to show their support by turning in their sealed
and unopened NLRB letters, preventing the participating employ-
ees from voting "no." Employees would be assured of secrecy
vis-:1-vis the union, despite the sixty-day open card check proce-
dure, because an employee who signed his card due to union
pressure would have the opportunity to, in effect, change his vote
back to "no" in secret later. Similarly, an employer would not be
allowed to ask employees whether they had voted against the un-
ion's conditional certification. This would prevent unfair labor
practices that coerce employees and prevent them from exercising
a true choice about "engaging in" or "refraining from" their rights
protected under Section 7 of the NLRA.2 0s
This reform is superior to that adopted in the NLRB's
now-reversed decision in Dana Corp.,2 09 which gave employees a
forty-five-day period after notice of a successful card check drive to
file a decertification petition. In Dana Corp., the Board repeatedly
stressed that the primary purpose of the NLRA is to ensure em-
ployee free choice, which is best protected by the privacy of secret
ballot elections:
[U]nlike votes cast in privacy by secret Board election ballots,
card signings are public actions, susceptible to group pressure
exerted at the moment of choice. The election is held under
the watchful eye of a neutral Board agent and observers from
the parties. A card signing has none of these protections.
207. See President Riverboat Casinos of Missouri, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 77 (1999) for the prop-
osition that it is currently an unfair labor practice for an employer to interrogate or inquire
about an employee's vote. See also MCGUINESS, supra note 23, at 168 ("Interrogation or poll-
ing of employees about their union sentiments is often held to constitute coercion and
election interference."). Because unions are permitted to ask employees to sign cards and
how they will vote, Section 8(b) (1)(A) likely would not otherwise cover this behavior and
would, therefore, need to be amended.
208. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
209. 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007). In this case, the Board held that no recognition bar
would be imposed following a card check based recognition unless employees were notified
of their right to file a decertification petition and filed such a petition within forty-five days.
Id. at 434. This decision was reversed by the NLRB in Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72
(2011), which returned to the NLRB's previous standard that does not allow a union's rep-
resentative status to be challenged for a reasonable time after an employer voluntarily
recognizes a union based on a showing of interest. The reform proposed in this Note re-
mains superior to the Board's traditional approach and that in its Dana Corp. decision, as it
makes employee choice paramount.
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There is good reason to question whether card signings in
such circumstances accurately reflect employees' true choice
concerning union representation. Workers sometimes sign
union authorization cards not because they intend to vote for
the union in the election but to avoid offending the person
who asks them to sign, often a fellow worker, or simply to get
the person off their back, since signing commits the worker to
nothing (except that if enough workers sign, the employer
210may decide to recognize the union without an election).
Yet, the Board's own decision is subject to the very same criti-
cism, as requiring employees to file a decertification petition does
not ensure employee privacy. Rather, the petition process itself can
involve pressure, coercion, and a lack of privacy vis-a-vis coworkers'
decisions to the same extent as the card check process. The majori-
ty attempts to address this critique:
The dissent faults our analysis here, observing that signing an
"employee antiunion petition" is also a public action subject
to group pressures. But there is an obvious difference. Such a
petition, where it secures the necessary support, obtains a se-
cret-ballot election. Union cards, on the other hand,
obtain[ed] under Keller Plastics voluntary recognition shield-
ed by an immediate election bar."'
But this argument fails to recognize that employee pressure is like-
ly to discourage employees from initiating or signing a
decertification petition in the first place, even if they knew that
their ultimate vote for a union's decertification would be private.
Thus, whether signing an authorization card at the outset or later
signing a decertification petition, an employee would be required
to participate in a public act and forced disclosure. In this regard,
Dana Corp. neither ensures the privacy of the secret ballot nor em-
ployee free choice.
Notably, the Board's further condemnation of card check in Da-
na Corp. results from the fact that:
[t]here are no guarantees of comparable safeguards in the
voluntary recognition process. While the provision of an or-
derly process for determining whether a fair election has been
conducted may result in substantial delay in a small minority
210. Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 438-39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
211. Id. at 439 n.19 (emphasis in original).
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of Board elections, it remains preferable to determine em-
ployee free choice by a method that can assure greater
112
regularity, fairness, and certainty in the final outcome.
The reforms to the card check process provided by Dana Corp. are
not only addressed in the reform proposed in this Note, but they
are improved upon. Like the Board's methodology in Dana Corp.,
this Note's approach allows unions to be certified pending
employees' later reflection on whether they prefer union
representation. Unlike the process imposed by the Board, however,
this Note ensures a prompt final determination and that employ-
ees have the ultimate protection of privacy in determining whether
they wish to act and seek a union's decertification-after the initial
card signing, no public action is required. And unlike the process
to obtain a secret ballot vote in Dana Corp., employees are guaran-
teed the right to register their opinion secretly in the privacy of
their own homes, where they will not feel the pressure of cowork-
ers, union organizers, or the employer.'13 As this consideration was
paramount to the Republican-appointed labor board that decided
Dana Corp., the reforms proposed here should be a conceptually
appealing compromise between the views of those who believe the
NLRA must be modified and others who prefer the status quo.
A union will not be certified if it either fails to obtain a majority
of signed cards during the sixty-day organizing period or if a ma-
jority of employees vote against its certification during the
214twenty-day revocation period. To prevent the workplace from be-
ing disrupted repeatedly, an election bar would be added to
Section 9(c) (3) of the NLRA to prevent that or any other union
from attempting to organize the same workforce again during a
*215one-year period.
CONCLUSION
This reform is superior to the current model for a number of
reasons. First, it ensures that employees are informed. By filing
with the Board prior to beginning a certification campaign, the
212. Id. at 439-40.
213. See Becker, supra note 85, at 566 (arguing that voting in the workplace environ-
ment unfairly prejudices a union).
214. In these cases, the dues that employees submitted with their signed initial union
authorization cards would be refunded to those individuals.
215. Under current law, an election bar prevents the Board from conducting an elec-
tion in any bargaining unit or subunit within which a valid election has been held in the
preceding twelve months. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3) (2006); McGUINESs, supra note 23, at 55.
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amended Act would ensure that both the union and the employer
have the opportunity to speak and be heard, allowing employees to
make an informed decision. Employers would be guaranteed
knowledge of the union's organization efforts, allowing them to
consult attorneys earlier in the process to learn about their rights
and obligations. This would provide several benefits. First, it might
actually reduce the incidence of unfair labor practices, because
employers would have time to ascertain the law before acting. Se-
cond, it would permit employers to present their views
contemporaneously with the union. Third, employees who do not
desire union representation would be able to express their opin-
ions to their fellow workers, ensuring that these employee
sentiments are allowed to develop and have a means of expression.
Fourth, the limited period during which unions can attempt to or-
ganize a workplace ensures that employees are not subject to the
pressures of a campaign for longer than the sixty-day period. Yet,
all union advantages are not lost under this system: unions would
still choose the time to launch their organizing efforts.*
Most important, however, is the establishment of conditional un-
ion certification. This two-stage approach corrects the "asymmetry"
inherent in the unionization process, as the second stage establish-
es a union default. The onus is on employees who do not desire
union representation to act. Whereas the current system increases
the likelihood of an employer victory by bringing the uncommitted
to the polls (who are more likely to vote to preserve the status
quo), here the status quo would be unionization. Moreover, em-
ployees who signed cards due to pressure, coercion, or
misrepresentation (or who refrained from signing cards due to
fear of employer retaliation) would be able to register their vote in
private, knowing that at the end of the day their voice was heard.
The employee's ultimate private vote, not the initial card check,
results in the union's certification. The process merely reverses the
burden so that employees are required to vote against certification
where a majority had previously indicated their support of unioni-
zation.
These reforms taken together would increase union legitimacy.
Although "merely changing the selection mechanism would do
nothing to make unions and employers more willing to deal with
each other,"' a holistic reform to the union organizing process
would ensure that unions, employees, and employers are fully in-
formed at every stage of the relationship. Unions that have
216. See EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 42.
217. Specter & Nguyen, supra note 91, at 331.
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majority employee support will still be certified, and will have an
advantage at the bargaining table with the employer-the employ-
er will be assured of the union's legitimacy, and will be more
inclined to bargain fairly with the union rather than stonewalling
union demands. Finally, employees, whose Section 7 rights this
proposal is designed to protect, will be assured that they are in-
formed, and that their voices are heard.
